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Democracy today faces many challenges: increasing political inequality, the decline
of widespread political participation, voter incompetence, the increasing power of
non-majoritarian organisations and institutions on the domestic and global stages,
the rise of global problems requiring multilateral collective action, the growing need
for specialised expertise in an increasingly complex public policy environment, and
the existence of often radical forms of social, political, and moral pluralism all
combine to exert significant pressure on existing democratic regimes. They also
problematise many of our core assumptions about democracy and its justification.
According to one familiar story, the theoretical strength of democracy over other
regimes is grounded in strong commitments to political equality and individual
liberty, best realised and protected by democratic systems. Individuals enjoy an
equal ability to influence the political agenda, either directly or via representatives,
and to have their concerns feed into wider processes of decision making and policy
formation. Functioning democracies provide meaningful opportunities for citizens
to communicate their concerns to decision makers and thereby effectively track the
will of the people. Democratic government is self-government: citizens are free in
so far as they live as equals under institutions and laws which are accountable to
them and which they could change or reject if they so wished.
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But this story is a fiction, at least when compared to democracy as currently
practised around the world. Of course, there have long been concerns among
political philosophers about the disconnect between the lived reality of democracy
and its philosophical justification. For example, in reality power is not exercised by
individual citizens but by interest groups, or lobbyists who often work against the
public interest rather than for it. But we are arguably reaching a point at which the
lived reality of democratic politics is so out of kilter with the philosophical vision on
which it is based that the practice is undermining the theory. A growing number of
philosophers and political scientists have explained recent failures of democracy in
terms of wider, deeper problems with the whole idea. The recent rise of populism,
and events such as Britain’s withdrawal from the EU (‘Brexit’) and the election of
President Trump, have shaken many people’s faith in democracy. The more we
learn about these events, the more it seems that the problem is systemic and
fundamental (Brennan 2016). Lack of political knowledge, declines in political
participation and engagement, distrust of politicians, growing political and
economic inequalities, complex and exclusionary systems of voting and registration,
and rising political elitism have arguably combined to pull democratic theory and
democratic practice in different directions.
What do we do about this? Do we need a new theory of democracy? Or do we
need reforms capable of realising the conventional ideal? Political philosophers
disagree. Those who believe that we need a new theory do not agree on what this
should look like. Achen and Bartels (2016) have argued for a new theory of
democracy which takes seriously real-world constraints on, for example, citizen
engagement and knowledge. Ilya Somin (2016) and Jason Brennan (2016) have
argued for a fundamental reappraisal of democracy in the light of political ignorance
among citizens. He´le`ne Landemore (2017) has suggested that representative
democracy is in crisis and needs to be replaced with a system that affords power to
citizens directly. Various reform remedies have been proposed. For instance, among
deliberative democrats, some have sought to establish mass deliberation among the
whole citizen body (e.g. Habermas 1997; Young 2002; Dryzek 2012), while others
have advocated limited opportunities for deliberation, perhaps constrained to mini-
publics, citizens juries, or other deliberative fora (e.g. Fishkin 1991; Fung 2015;
Lafont 2014). Others have eschewed the deliberative route, for other approaches
more focused on ideas of radical contestation (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Bevir
2010), or representation (Runciman 2014).
An important theme running through this debate is that participation in
democratic life is a good thing and that widespread participation makes democracy
stronger. But rates of political participation among citizens of many liberal
democratic states are low and, in some countries, declining (Parvin 2009). Many
citizens do not want to engage in political activity and are uninterested in
politics. This raises profound questions for democratic theory and practice. For
example, a number of theorists have suggested that citizens have a duty to
participate in democratic life and that, if they fail to discharge this duty, they can be
legitimately coerced into participating (Lawrence and Birch 2015; Hill 2015;
Lacroix 2007; Lijphart 1997). Others have suggested that political participation is
less important than is often thought and should not be coerced (Saunders 2012;
4 P. Parvin, B. Saunders
123
Lever 2010), or that many citizens are ill-equipped to participate responsibly
(Brennan 2012). Others still have argued that we need to expand the opportunities
open to individuals to contribute to the democratic system, especially as political
participation is declining disproportionately among citizens of a low socio-
economic status. More generally, the changing patterns of political participation
observed by political scientists over the past half-century challenge many of the
normative approaches to democratic reform popular among political philosophers,
as they seem to require wider and richer forms of political participation at a time
when citizens do not seem willing or able to engage in even the most minimal forms
of participation required by representative democracy (Parvin 2015, 2016).
The essays in this special edition of Res Publica shine new light on some of these
challenges, and draw out their implications for democratic theory and practice. They
ask a range of connected questions about the ethics of political participation in
democracies, including the duties of citizens, appropriate state institutions, and the
role of non-state organisations. The questions these authors ask, and the answers
they give, strike at the heart of our contemporary democratic predicament, raising
profound questions about how our politics should be structured and what it is for.
Sarah Birch seeks to connect normative debates around participation with
empirical findings. She argues that it is inappropriate to analyse the decision to vote
in economic or rational choice terms, for most people regard voting as a duty. The
reason that many people nonetheless fail to vote is that they face a collective action
problem and compulsory voting can overcome this by ensuring that each citizen
does his or her bit to sustain democracy. The aim is not to reduce the costs of voting,
but to ensure that they are equitably shared between all citizens. While Birch notes
that equitable burden sharing does not necessarily require every citizen to vote in
every election, but might be satisfied by each person voting in alternate elections,
she goes on to challenge the view that it is better if some, less knowledgeable,
citizens do not vote. Whereas voluntary voting may lead to politics dominated by
committed partisans and ideologues, universal participation is likely to lead to more
moderate politics. She concludes by arguing that all citizens have an obligation to
contribute to the collective good of a democratic polity and that this can justify
restricting individual freedom, much as we restrict freedom in other areas of life,
such as traffic regulations.
Phil Parvin argues that often democrats place too high a value on citizen
participation and engagement in their theories, which renders them problematic
when most liberal states are experiencing declining rates of engagement. In
particular, he critiques deliberative democratic theory for presupposing and
requiring the presence of a flourishing civil society which can build citizens’
democratic capacity and mobilise citizens. Parvin draws on empirical data to show
that the past five decades or so have seen a withering of the conditions necessary for
deliberative democracy to function, which undermines the persuasiveness of
deliberative democracy as a strategy for democratic reform. Parvin suggests that
deliberative democrats require citizens to participate more often, and in more
demanding ways, than they currently do. He argues that instead of requiring more of
citizens, we should be requiring less of them, acknowledging that citizens will
probably not participate in the volume, or in the ways, that many democratic
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theorists would like. Therefore, we need an alternative approach: a regime which
can produce democratic outcomes, and meet the requirements of political equality,
without widespread participation among citizens.
Jason Brennan further develops the argument for epistocracy that he presented in
his book Against Democracy, by tackling what he calls the ‘demographic objection’
to his view (Brennan 2016). This objection states that his argument for epistocracy
would unfairly concentrate political power in the hands of a privileged, educated
elite and would undermine the interests of disadvantaged groups who have not been
able to develop their political knowledge to the extent that wealthier people have.
Brennan argues that the demographic objection to epistocracy fails and that, to the
extent that it undermines epistocracy, it also undermines democracy. If epistocrats
should be worried about the demographic objection, then democrats should be
worried too, so the demographic objection cannot be used by democrats to reject
epistocracy.
Demetris Tillyris discusses the question of political disengagement and its
causes. In particular, he asks whether citizens are right to be sceptical about
democracy and its ability to achieve what we often think it should. Many citizens
disengage from politics because they believe that the system is corrupt or immoral,
or that politicians act in ways which are incompatible with democratic values or
morality. However, citizens often have unrealistically high expectations of what
democracies can achieve, and how ‘pure’ or ‘good’ or politics can be. Tillyris
argues that politicians should have ‘integrity’, but that this does not mean they
should be necessarily ‘virtuous’ or morally pure. It may be, therefore, that what
citizens see as immoral or unvirtuous behaviour on the part of politicians is nothing
of the sort.
Kevin Elliott shifts attention from participation to attentive citizenship. While
attentiveness need not lead to active participation—for it is compatible with
‘reflective apathy’—it seems necessary for responsible participation. Moreover,
attentive citizenship may itself suffice to secure many of the benefits of monitory
democracy, even if citizens do not actually participate, for the mere threat of their
doing so may motivate elites to anticipate how citizens might respond to their
actions. Elliott argues that the democratic state ought to promote attentive
citizenship in order to safeguard the fair value of political liberties and to protect
groups from under-representation. While some may take these considerations to
ground an individual duty to be an attentive citizen, Elliott’s concern is with the role
of the state. He argues that the state may use coercive means to promote justice and
this may justify compelling citizens to vote or to attend civic education courses.
Ben Saunders argues against compulsion, even if universal participation would
be beneficial, if it violates a right not to vote. The claim is not simply that
compulsion reduces freedom, but that it violates individual rights which constrain
what can be done for the good of society. The first part of his paper analyses what
such a right might mean, using the framework developed by Wesley Hohfeld
(1913). In order to pose an objection to compulsory voting, it would have to be a
claim not to be forced to vote, rather than simply a privilege to abstain. The second
part of his paper seeks to defend such a right. Saunders does not seek to establish
definitively that we have a right not to vote, since this may require a complete
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theory of rights, but he sets out to show that previous criticisms of this right are
either unconvincing or miss their target. Some arguments, such as those of Hill
(2015), suggest that there is a duty to vote, but this would be compatible with it
being rights-violating to force people to do so.
Finally, Eva Erman discusses the legitimacy of civil society actors in global
governance. Erman points to the central role that civil society actors of one kind or
another play in the development of policy on the world stage and asks whether such
actors have a rightful place in a system which understands power as legitimated by
the people. She argues that unelected organisations do have a legitimate place in
global governance, and so have democratic legitimacy, as long as they fulfil certain
‘functions’ in this process. Civil society actors’ legitimacy has too often been
grounded in the role they play in bridging citizens and states, Erman argues. She
suggests that we drop this approach and instead look at what more specific functions
such actors play, and what specific contributions they make, to democratic decision
making on the world stage.
Many of these papers were first presented at a workshop on The Ethics of
Political Participation, held at Loughborough University, 21 June 2016. The
organiser of that workshop, Phil Parvin, would like to thank everyone who
participated in this event, including those in the audience who contributed through
their excellent comments and feedback.
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